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Evolution of Time Preference by Natural Selection
By A l a n  R. R o g e r s *
This paper entertains the hypothesis that human time preferences are in evolu­
tionary equilibrium (i.e. that no mutation changing time preferences could be 
favored by natural selection). This hypothesis implies that the marginal rate o f  
substitution (M RS ) holding Darwinian fitness constant must equa! the MRS 
holding utility constant. Furthermore, in a market economy the latter must 
equal the M RS in exchange. Exploiting these principles, I  find that the long-term 
real interest rate should equal tn(2) per generation (about 2 percent per year) 
and that young adults should discount the future more rapidly than their elders. 
( JEL  D91, E43)
Preferences are central to economic the­
ory, yet little is known about them. Because 
of (.his ignorance, economists have worked 
hard to make their assumptions about pref­
erences as mild as possible, and economic 
theory has grown more abstract and general 
over the years. This has cushioned the the­
ory against violations of assumptions but 
has not increased its power. Economics 
would gain much from a theory of prefer­
ences. The theory of evolutionary genetics 
may be useful in this regard. If genes affect 
preferences, then an evolutionary model 
may succeed in predicting them.1
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ideas al the Santa Fe Institute in April 1992, at the 
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1992, and at the Univi sily of Chicago's Rational 
Choice Seminar in Apri 1993. This work was sup­
ported in part hy grants from (he U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (MGN 1 R29 UM39593) 
and from the National Science Foundation (DBS- 
92! 1255).
’This proposal has been made previously by 
economists including Gary S. Becker (1976), Hirsh­
leifer (1977), R. H, Coase, (1978), Paul H. Rubin and 
Cris W. Paul (1979), Heinrich W. Ursprung (1988). and
The proposal that preferences have 
evolved by natural selection may strike some 
readers as strange. It is customary to think 
of selection acting on “ biological” charac­
ters such as size, shape, and patterns o f  
fertility, but less customary to view prefer­
ences in the same light. Yet there seems 
really to be no basis for this prejudice. Con­
sider, for example, preferences concerning 
mates. Most individuals prefer to mate with 
opposite-sexed individuals of their own 
spccies. Presumably, this is because those 
who preferred otherwise left few offspring: 
they were selected against. How else—  
except by natural selection— can such pref­
erences be explained? If selection affects 
mating preference, then why not time pref­
erence? Every animal that builds a nest or 
burrow is deferring immediate consumption
Ingemar Hansson and Charles Stuart (1990). In addi­
tion, several authors have published evolutionary mod­
els of lime preference. Some have used ideas from the 
theory of optimal foraging in an effort to understand 
how animals discount rewards over delays measnred in 
seconds or minutes (John H. Kage) el al., 1986; A, W. 
Logue, 1988). Others (Gordon Getty, 1989, 1991; 
Hansson and Stuart, 1990) have tried to explain lime 
preference over intervals of years and decades. The 
model 1 present here deals with time preference on 
this longer lime scale. II differs from Geliy's in empha­
sizing preferences ralher than production and in incor- 
poraiing a more complex model of the life cycle. It 
differs from that of Hansson and Stuarl in considering 
lime preference within as well as between generations, 
and in allowing for sexual reproduction.
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for a'delayed reward. Thus, time preference 
has an ancient evolutionary history.
It rnight also be objected that time prefer­
ence is shaped by learning and culture, not 
by natural selection. In response, one can 
argue that the capacity for culture is itself 
shaped by natural selection, so that we tend 
to learn what selection would have favored 
anyway. I have shown elsewhere (Rogers, 
1988) that neither of these positions is en­
tirely corrcct. A  model of natural selection 
will predict more poorly where cultural 
transmission is important. However, the re­
duction in predictive power may be small. 
Thus, a model ignoring culture may prove 
useful even if patterns of time preference 
are transmitted culturally.
Below, Section 1 defines the marginal 
rates of substitution and of time preference 
and sumniiiriy.es previous results tn'm eco­
nomies and evolutionary genetics; Section II 
combines these to derive new results con­
cerning the intertemporal utility function 
and the real interest rate. These results all 
assume complete certainty about which in­
dividual will enjoy the returns from an 
investment. Section III relaxes this last 
assumption, allowing the returns to be 
directed toward an initially unspecified 
relative of the investor. In this context, 
the marginal rate of time preference turns 
out to vary both with the age of the investor 
and with the delay between investment and 
return on investment. Finally, the results 
are summarized and discussed in Sec­
tion IV.
I. Preliminaries
A. Marginal Rates o f  Substitution 
in Preference, in Exchange,
and in Fitness
Immediate benefits are ordinarily pre­
ferred over henefits that are delayed. Irving 
Fisher’s (1930) graphical analysis of this 
matter is shown in Figure 1. The dotted 
indifference curves there connect points of 
equal utility. The absolute value of the slope 
of an indifference curve is called the 
marginal rate o f substitution (M R S ) in pref­
erences and measures the rate at which pre­
Noles: jf(.r) iind /c(jr + 7 ) denoie consumption al ages 
.r anti j ‘ + r, respectively. The dolled indifference 
curves show ihe coniour map of a hypothetical u 1 iJity 
function. The solid "market line" has slope -  e'T, 
where / is the interest rale. The dashed 45° line 
connects points al which k( x + r ) = k( x ).
sent and future consumption can be substi­
tuted without affecting utility.
The solid “ market line" in the figure con­
nects points of equal wealth. By borrowing, 
the individual at A  can move along the 
market line toward B. The move from C to 
B, on the other hand, is accomplished by 
lending. The absolute slope of the market 
line is called the MRS in exchange. The 
optimum B occurs where the M RS in pref­
erences is equal to that in exchange.
Following Hansson arid Stuart (1990), I 
define the MRS in fitness as the marginal 
rate at which two goods can he substituted 
without changing Darwinian fitness.2 An
‘ In models with discrete generations, Darwinian 
illness is the conditionally expected number oT an 
individual’s offspring, given i(s genotype. In models 
wilh overlapping generations, limess is measured by 
R. A. Fisher’s (1958) "Malthusian parameter," 
which measures ihe asymptotic rate of exponential in­
crease in the numbers of one’s descendants (Brian 
Charlesworlh, 1980).
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allele3 that encourages substitution at this 
rate is neither favored nor disfavored by 
natural selection: it is selectively neutral. If 
preferences have been shaped by natural 
selection, then individuals should be indif­
ferent to choices that do not affect fitness. 
Thus in evolutionary equilibrium the M RS  
in fitness must equal the M RS in prefer­
ences. I exploit this principle below by de­
riving an expression for the M RS in fitness 
and setting it equal first to the M RS in 
preferences and then to the M RS in ex­
change.
The analysis will employ two familiar rep­
resentations of the M RS in preferences. 
First, 1 write it in terms of the marginal rate 
o f  time preference (M R T P ), which measures 
the extent to which a unit increase in pre­
sent consumption is preferred to a unit in­
crease in future consumption. If I am indif­
ferent between another apple today and e9T 
apples delayed by r years, then 6 is my 
M R TP for apples. The M R T P  is related to 
the M RS in preferences by
(1)
cI k (  x  +  t )  
d x ( x )
where k( x )  is consumption at age x, U  is 
utility, and the derivative is taken along a 
line of constant utility. The left side is, by 
definition, the M RS in preferences. In gen­
eral, 0 will be a function of age x, of the 
time-delay t  between investment and re­
turn on investment, and of the dated con­
sumption levels k(jc) and k ( x  +  r) .
A  second familiar expression for the M RS  
in preferences is obtained by writing the 
utility of a consumption stream beginning at 
time /„ and ending at /, as
(2) U= [ ' ' e - ^ ' - ,a)u[K{t) ]di
J'o
where *■(/) is consumption at time /, (/[*■(/)]
‘ The word allele refers to a variant o f a gene. Thus, 
a gene that occurs in two forms such as "altruist" and 
“ nonaltruisl" is a gene with two alleles.
is the utility of this dated consumption^ and 
17 is the subjective rate o f utility discount. 
The M RS in preferences between k ( x  +  t )  
and k(jc) is
(3)
d x ( x +  r )
d x ( j f ) U  constant
e'  +
where h J k ] =  d u [ i< )/dK  is the marginal 
utility of dated increments to consumption 
(Hirshleifer, 1970 p. 127).
Finally, I will make use of the fact that 
the real interest rate i is related to the 
M R S in exchange by
(4)
d x ( x  +  t )  
dx (  x ) I W const a n(
where W is wealth and the derivative is 
taken along a line of constant wealth, that 
is, along the solid market line in F igure'!. 
The left side is, by definition, the M RS in 
exchange.
A t simultaneous evolutionary and market 
equilibrium, each of these marginal rates of 
substitution must equal the M RS in fitness. 
In deriving an expression for this latter 
quantity, I will need results from the evolu­
tionary theory of kin selection.
B. Results from  the Theory 
o f  Kin Selection
The theory of kin selection (W . D. Hamil­
ton, 1964a, b) is about altruism toward rela­
tives. It tells when natural selection will 
favor an “altruist allele,” which predisposes 
its bearer toward some behavior that de­
creases its own Darwinian fitness but in­
creases that of a relative. Those who pro­
vide these benefits are called “donors” ; 
those who receive benefits arc called “ re­
cipients.”
Kin selection is relevant to economic 
problems of investment decision because the 
returns from an investment may affect the 
Darwinian fitness of the investor’s relatives
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Nmes: The altruist allele is favored (disfavored) by selection if the sum of row products is positive (negative). The 
notation is defined in the text. To simplify the table, I assume that ihe sex ratio at birth is unjiy, that effects on 
survival are brief, thal these effects are small enough that second-order terms in AP can be ignored, and that a 
single recipient is affected by each act of altruism.
Source: Rogers (1993 appendix A).
rather than that of the investor himself. For 
example, benefits received by a woman of 
age 50 cannot increase the number of her 
own children but may increase that of her 
daughter. The “ investor” of economic par­
lance becomes the “donor” in kin-selection 
theory. The “ recipient” in kin-selection the­
ory is the individual (or individuals) whose 
Darwinian fitness is increased by the re­
turns from that investment. Often, the re­
cipient will be the donor (investor) himself. 
I will continue to use the term “altruism” in 
this case, although this usage is nonstan­
dard; in ordinary usage it is not altruism 
unless the recipient is someone else.
The fate of an altruist allele depends not 
only on the delay between investment and 
return, but also on the ages of the donor 
and recipient. I assume that the investment 
is made when the donor’s age is and 
benefits the recipient t years later when the 
recipient’s age is x 2. The fate of the altruist 
allele depends also on the coefficient of 
relationship,4 r, between donor and recipi­
ent. If the donor and recipient are the same 
individual, then r =  1 and x 2 = x t +  t .
Subscripts m and f will denote males and 
females, respectively. In the absence of al­
truism, an individual of sex g will survive 
from age x to x +  dx with probability Px(x) ,  
He or she will survive from birth to age x 
with probability /^(jc ). A n  individual of sex
'“Wright's coefficient of relationship (J. F. Crow and 
M. Kimura, 1970 pp. 69. 137-38) can be interpreted as 
the fraction of their genes that two individuals can 
expect to hold in common. It equals 1 if the donor and 
refipiem are the same individual, j  if the recipient is 
an offspring, J if a grandchild, and so forth.
g who reaches age x can expcct to produce 
m g{ x )  offspring of sex g before age x +  dx. 
These age-specific rates of survival and 
fertility are assumed to be constant, 
which implies, under mild additional as­
sumptions.5 that the population will eventu­
ally converge to a stable age distribution. 
Thereafter, its growth is exponential. I de­
note by p the rate of exponential population 
growth in the absence of altruism.
In general, the fate of the altruist allele 
will depend on how it affects survival and 
fertility. In this paper, I ignore effects on 
fertility and consider effects on survival 
alone. The effect of a given interaction is 
assumed to be brief, of duration dx. Altru­
ism changes survival probabilities at age .r, 
in the donor and age x 2 in the recipient, 
adding A P ( jc , )  to the survival of the donor 
and A P { x ] +  t )  to that of the recipient. In 
the usual case, the interaction harms the 
donor and benefits the recipient, so A F ( x t ) 
< 0  and +  t )  >  0. For mathematical
convenience, I assume that these effects are 
small enough that second-order terms can 
be ignored.
I have derived elsewhere (Rogers, 1993) 
the conditions under which the altruist al­
lele will increase in frequency, and these 
are summarized in Table 1. In the table, 
subscripts D  and R indicate the sex of the 
donor and the recipient. The reproductive
5It is sufficient that there be positive fertility in two 
adjacent age classes (J. H. Pollard, 1973 pp. 42-44).
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value (R. A. Fisher, 1958) is defined by
and can be interpreted as the expected pre­
sent value of an individual’s future contri­
butions to the gene pool. The equivalence 
of li U ‘ ) to the expected present value 
follows from the following observations. 
First, the probability of surviving from 
age x to age y is I s(y)/1 g{x) .  Thus. 
m ( y ) l l, ( y ) / l ^ i x )  is the expectcd number 
of offspring that an individual of age x will 
produce at age y. The reproductive value is 
a sum of these contributions, discounted 
exponentially at rate p.
The rationale for this discounting can be 
understood as follows. The birth of an altru­
ist at time y increases the frequency of the 
altruist allele by l/ [2 M y ) ] ,  where N ( y )  is 
the size of the population at time y. Thus, 
one must weight each birth by 1 /[7N{y)\.  
This is equivalent to weighting by e~py since 
my assumptions imply that the population is 
increasing exponentially at rate p. In (jt), 
births at age y >  .v are discounted by
\ / \ l N { x ) ]
In effect, this takes births at age x as a 
numeraire, or unit of value. The value of a 
birth at age y is measured by the number of 
births at age x that would be needed to 
produce the same effect on allele frequency.
The fate of the altruist allele is deter­
mined by the sum of the products of the 
entries in the two rows of Table 1. The 
allele will increase in frequency when rareh
'The theory holds not only when ihe altruist allele is 
rare (with frequency near zero), but also when its 
frequency is near unity. There is no theory for ihe ease 
of an allele of intermediate frequency,
if this sum is positive, and decrease if it is 
negative. The allele is selectively neutral if 
the sum is zero. Elsewhere (Rogers, 1993), 1 
justify this result in two ways, one rigorous 
and the other heuristic. Here, I paraphrase 
the heuristic justification.
The altruist allele is expressed only if the 
donor survives to perform an altruistic act 
at age Thus, column (ii) shows that the 
allele’s effect is proportional to the proba­
bility /D(X [) of this event. It is also propor­
tional to the additive effects on the age- 
specific survival of donor and recipient, as 
shown in column (iii). Multiplying by repro­
ductive value in column (iv) expresses these 
effects on survival in terms of future births 
discounted back to age +  dx in the case 
of the donor, and to x 2 +  dx in the case of 
the recipient. The additional discount fac­
tors in column (v) discount these future 
births back to the time when the donor’s 
age was zero, thus expressing all births in a 
common currency. The product of columns 
( i i )- (v ) gives the expected effect of an altru­
ist gene on births, appropriately discounted. 
However, I am not interested in all births, 
but only in the births of new altruist individ­
uals. Thus, column (vi) multiplies by the 
coefficient of relationship r, which can be 
interpreted as the probability that the recip­
ient has the altruist allele given that the 
donor does.7
Having justified the entries in Table 1, I 
will now examine its implications.
In this section 1 show how the M RS in 
fitness can be expressed in terms of demo­
graphic parameters, the degree of kinship 
between donor and recipient, and the over­
all rate of population growth. Throughout 
this section, I assume that the individuals 
involved in an interaction are known with 
certainty.
7This interpretation is valid when the inheritance 
system is diploid and the altruist allele is rare.
II. The MRS in Fitness when Recipients are 
Known with Certainty
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' A . The MRS in Fil ness and Irving 
Fisher's Indifference Diagram
The altruist allele is selectively neutral if 
the sum of row products in Table 1 is zero, 
that is, if
i'dU, + dx)AP(Xi)
+  e~prw R( x 2 + d x ) A P ( x } +  r )  = 0.
Rearranging this expression yields the M RS  
in fitness between increments to the survival 
of the altruist and survival of the recipient:
( 6 ) MRS,, = -
A />(*,) 
t-'nUi +  dx)
re n'ruR( x 1 T dx) re p7t-'R(jr2)
where the approximation assumes that the 
duration dx of effects on survival is small. 
M RSp specifies the rate at which the sur­
vival of the donor can be substituted for the 
(delayed) survival of the recipient without 
affecting Darwinian fitness.
I now use this result to construct an ana­
logue of the indifference diagram in Figure 
1. The dotted lines in Figure 2 connect 
points of equal fitness and may thus be 
called fitness isograrns. As the graph shows, 
the fitness isograms are convex to the origin.8
bIn deriving this result, 1 take dx as lhe time uni! so 
that v(x + dx)= l(x + 1). Since p is constant along a 
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To relate this result to economics, I as­
sume that P  is not only a function of age, 
but is also a differentiable function of con­
sumption. Thus, P — Ptx, k(jc)] where k(jc) 
is consumption at age x. Further suppose 
that the mortality trade-off discusscd above 
is caused by a trade-off in consumption. The 
donor forgos some consumption at age jc, 
in return for a delayed increase in the con­
sumption of the recipient, who is then 
of age x 2. Specifically, the donor’s con­
sumption at age jc, changes from k(jc,) to 
« ( * , )  +  Ak(jc,), while that of the recipient 
at age x 2 changes from k ( x 2) to x ( x 2) + 
A k ( ji:, +  t ). If these changes in consumption 
are small, then
A /’ ( * , )  = P J jc, , * ( * , ) ]  A k ( x ,)
A P ( j :1 +  t )  = P k [ j : 2 , k ( j : 2 ) ]  Ak(x ,  +  t )
where Plt =  dP/dx.  Substituting these into 
equation (6) gives the M RS in fitness be­
tween the consumption of the donor and 
the delayed consumption of the recipient:
(7 ) M R S , a
Ak ( jc, l  t )  
A k ( jc,)
M R S,
j '
M R S* is obtained by multiplying M RSp by 
the ratio of marginal effects of consumption 
on survival of the donor and recipient. If P
lo obtain




which is always negative. Thus, MRS,. decreases with 
increasing values of P (x t). and the fitness isogram is 
convex.
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Survival Consumpt ion  '
P {x  +  r )
1
2 k ( x +  r )
0
P ( x )  k ( x )
Fiourf 2. Indifffrenctl Diagkams on Survival and Consumption Axfs
Nates: The dolled lines  in each panel arc fitness isograms, which are equivalent lo indifference curves under 
evolutionary equilibrium. The solid market lines define opportunities for lending and borrowing. The left panel 
refers to cffects on survival and exhibits Ihe indifference curves implied by equation (6). The image of these curves 
in (he right panel is even more convex, because of the diminishing marginal effect of consumption on survival.
has the properties that are usually at­
tributed to utility— increasing with con­
sumption, but al a decreasing rate— then 
the transformation from survival to con­
sumption axes will increase the convexity of 
the fitness isograms (John Hicks and Roy 
G. D. Allen, 1934), as shown in the right- 
hand panel of Figure 2.
At evolutionary equilibrium, the M RS in 
fitness must equal that in preferences, and 
the fitness isograms in Figure 2 become 
indifference curves. To recover the familiar 
indifference diagram of economics, we need 
only introduce a market line, which is drawn 
as a solid line in both panels of Figure 2. As  
usual, the market line defines opportunities 
for lending or borrowing and is straight 
when drawn on consumption axes. Jn the 
left panel, however, it is concave to the 
origin becausc of the nonlinear transforma­
tion from consumption axes to survival axes.
In adding the market line, one need not 
assume that credit markets have been im­
portant throughout human evolution. The 
hypothesis o f evolutionary equilibrium  
merely specifies the form of the indifference 
curves. This equilibrium may have been 
reached long before the advent of credit 
markets. Given these preferences, Irving
Fisher’s (1930) argument (Fig. I) explains 
how modern humans can maximize utility 
hy lending and borrowing. The hypothesis 
of evolutionary equilibrium modifies Fisher’s 
argument only by giving definite form to 
indifference curves that were arhitrary in 
Fisher’s analysis.
Equations ( 6) and (7) identify several fac­
tors that contribute to the preference for 
immediate rather than delayed consump­
tion. First, if the time path of consumption 
is increasing and the henefits of investment 
will go to the investor himself, then 
P J x v i)] >  P J x 2, k(.v2)], thus inflating 
MRS„. This is the familiar effect of dimin­
ishing marginal utility on indifference 
curves, which accounts for the increased 
convexity of indifference curves drawn on 
consumption axes. But this is not the whole 
story. M RS„ is further inflated by M R S P, 
the product of e "7, r~\  and i-’D(jc, ) / r(jc2)- 
The first two of these factors are never less 
than unity. The third exceeds unity when 
the donor is adult and is also the recipient. 
Thus, M R S ;J will usually exceed unity for 
adult donors. This implies that, for such 
donors, MRS^ will usually exceed unity even 
along the 45° line, where present and 
future consumption arc equal. The excep-
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tiijus'will involve transfers from aged adulls 
with low reproductive value to their off­
spring with higher reproductive value. This 
provides an evolutionary explanation for 
positive time preference.
B. The Marginal Rale o f  Utility 
Discount and the Marginal 
Utility o f  Consumption
The procedure of equating the M RS in 
Htness with that in preferences also pro­
vides a variety of algebraic results. Substi­
tuting (6) into (7) and setting the result 
equal to (3) gives
u „.[«■( A’V
( 8) - v r  
c ■ « . . [ * ( -v +  7 )1
rp( -vr) ^ [ -T 1
J R( T2 ) ;
This requires that the marginal utility of 
consumption be a function of age x as well 
as consumption k , and that it be propor­
tional to the reproductive value r(,v). For 
example, one might define
(9) uk[ k ] = uji'.x] a  PK[ j,*][■( X)
(LO) rj =  - ( I n  r ) / r  +  p
where for simplicity I have suppressed sub­
scripts denoting sex.<: Economic models typ­
ically assume the function it to be indepen­
dent of age. It seems impossible to reconcile 
this assumption with the hypothesis of evo­
lutionary equilibrium.
Thus, the evolutionary perspective re­
stricts the range of permissible formulations 
of intertemporal utility. It also broadens 
their scope to include consumption by rela­
9Tim is not ihi: i>r,V .l.-'iniilnr o f u ,md rj that is 
consistent with (N). 1 have included > in I he expression 
lor 77 because it will vary with the length of delay, 
provided lhai bene fils ;-jnrivin^L liTilt i\ deiay ol one 
generation 10 offspring. those arriving after two 
generations go to grandchildren. and so on.
tives, weighted by the coefhcient of relation­
ship, This suggests a restriction on the “dy­
nastic utility function” of Becker and Robert 
J. Barro (1988), which assigns arbitrary 
weights to the consumption of descendant 
generations. In evolutionary equilibrium 
those weights are no longer arbitrary.
Equation (10) relates the subjective rate 
77 of utility discount to r, r, and p. In the 
special case when recipient and donor are 
the same individual, r =-- 1 and therefore 
77 =  p. The relevant value of p is not the 
current rate of population growth, but that 
which prevailed on average during some 
long but unknown period of evolutionary 
history. Apart from the last couple of cen­
turies, p must have been on average very 
near zero (Colin MeEvcdy and Richard 
Jones, 1978). Thus, equation (10) implies 
that rj =  0 when donor and recipient are the 
same individual. When u satisfies equation
(9), there is no additional discounting due 
to length of delay. Consequently, rj is 
needed only in models that allow intergen­
erational transfers.
When intergenerational transfers do oc­
cur, equation ( 10) says that the subjective 
rate of utility discount is 17 =  -  (In r ) / r .  For 
a given degree of relatedness r between 
donor and recipient, rj is inversely propor­
tional to the delay r  between cost (invest­
ment) and benefit (return on investment). 
However, tbis conclusion may not hold in 
general, since r is likely to vary as a func­
tion of 7 [see footnote (9)].
C. The Long-Term Real Interest Rate
An expression for the long-term interest 
rate can be obtained by setting
(11) MRS„. =  e 'T
a procedure justified under evolutionary 
equilibrium by equation (4). To simplify the 
result, 1 restrict attention to the ease of an 
investment that benefits the investor’s 
daughter after exactly one generation. By 
assumption, the mother and daughter are 
affected at the same age, so that i 'u(jf , ) = 
r R( x , ) ,  and M RSp =  r " lepl, where r \ is
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the coefficient of relationship between 
mother and daughter, and r equals T, the 
generation length.10 In stationary equilib­
rium, the mother and daughter will have 
equal wealth at this common age, so that 
MRS,, =  MRS,.. I am thus restricting atten­
tion to points along the dashed 45° line in 
Figure 2. Equation (11) becomes 2epT =  e ‘T,
(12) / = (In 2 )/  7' + p.
The generation time T  is usually a little Jess 
than 30 years in human populations. For 
example, T  = 28.9 in the 1906 population of 
Taiwan (Hamilton, 1966). Thus, if p ~  0, 
selection should favor long-term interest 
rates that average (In2)/28.9 =  G.024 per 
year," which is in reasonable agreement 
with observation.
Time-productivity does not appear explic­
itly in this analysis. However, in equilibrium 
the intergenerational MRS,, must also equal 
the marginal time-productivity of intergen- 
erationa) investment, for any discrepancy 
between the two would trigger a capital 
accumulation or decumulation process 
eventually restoring the equilibrium (see 
Hirsh lei fe r, 1970 p. 172). In a Malthusian 
interpretation, the accumulation process 
would take the form of a population surge, 
rather than a capital surge, but would lead 
in either case to an equilibrium along the 
45° line.12
"’There arc several measures of generation length 
m demography (Ansley J. C'oale. 1972). The inosl ap­
propriate here is Ihe mean age of childbearing (i.e.. the 
average age of mothers of newborn daughters): T = 
Sl.ac :,'1/r(-f)nj1(.r),
"This is similar lo Geliy's ( 1 9 8 V ,  1 9 9 1 )  finding llial 
i ■ \ , T. The similarity is probably mere coincidence, 
however, as Paul Romer has pointed out to inc. Getty 
assumes that i must match the rale of production of 
aggregate fitness (i.e.. the rate at which siew individuals 
are recruited into Ihe population). Since the popula­
tion replaces ilself once per generation, the recruit­
ment rale R must satisfy RT — 1 in stationary equilib­
rium. Setting R = i produces Getty's conclusion that 
i - ! ! T.
i:More explicitly, the Malthusian interpretation as­
sumes that: (i) A population will grow whenever its 
members find that marginal time-productivity of inter- 
generationai investment exceeds MRS„. (The produc-
These conclusions require qualification. 
In equating marginal rates of substitution in 
preferences and in exchange, I have implic­
itly assumed that maximization of utility re­
quires some nonzero transfer of consump­
tion from donor to recipient. This is not 
necessarily so: the donor will not dispense 
benefits to all potential recipients. Further­
more, I have assumed that at the time an 
individual contemplates some altruistic act, 
he or she somehow knows in advance both 
the age and the reiatedness of the recipient. 
I have not allowed for the possibility that 
there will be no recipient at all. To deaf 
with these complications, one needs a statis­
tical model incorporating uncertainty about 
which relative, if any. will eventually receive 
the benefit.
I now assume that the identity of the 
recipient is initially uncertain. Uncertainty 
might be incorporated in several ways, and I 
have tried to choose the simplest. I assume 
that when a benefit arrives it wiil be allo­
cated among potential recipients (including 
the donor herself) so as to maximize its 
discounted value to the donor. Since the 
benefits in my mode! are very small, I rule 
out the possibility of distributing a benefit 
among several recipients. Bcfow, Subsection 
III-A  will incorporate uncertainty into the 
theory, Subsection U I-B  will show how the 
parameters of this extended theory can be 
estimated, and Subsection III-C  will use de­
mographic data from natural-fertility popu­
lations to draw inferences about time pref­
erence.
livity pays for larger families.) (ii) Marginal time- 
productivity is. however, a declining function of popu­
lation size. (This must be so under any form of 
density-dependent population regnlation.) Thus, (iii) at 
stationary equilibrium. MRS,, must equal Ihe margi­
nal lime-produclivily of intergenerational investment, 
(iv) This same equilibrium also requires that She con­
sumption of a daughter al age 25 equals that which her 
mother enjoyed at age 25: consequently MRS„ = 
MRSr . I thank Jack Hirshleifer for this Malthusian 
interpretation.
III. Uncertainty Concerning Recipients
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A. The Evolutionary Discount Function
As before, I assume that an altruist allele 
adds A P ( x t ) to the donor’s survival at age 
x }, and A P ( x t +  t )  to the recipient’s when 
the donor’s age is jr, +  t . Now however, the 
recipient’s age, reproductive value, and co­
efficient of relationship are all random vari­
ables. This requires that the row-products 
in Table 1 be replaced by their expectations. 
The altruist allele is selectively neutral when 
the sum of these expected row-producls is 
zero. If the duration dx of effects is small, 
this sum is approximately
L:u ( x < )  A jU ( * i )
+  e “ ''TE (rt;R(jr2) }A / 5( j r l +  r )  =  0
where E  denotes the expectation. In taking 
this expectation, I define r R(A'2) =  0 when 
there is no recipient at all. Rearranging 
gives
(13 ) M R S,
A P ( x l +  t )
A P { x t )
f'u( -O 
E {r e - "TL,K(jc2) }
To facilitate presentation of numerical re­
sults, I define an evolutionary discount func­
tion A, which satisfies
(14 ) M R S P =  exp
,JT + T
A( x , iv) dw
This formulation is general enough to ac­
commodate almost any pattern of discount­
ing. For example, when A is a constant, 
future survival benefits are discounted expo­
nentially at a constant rate. On the other 
hand, hyperbolic discounting (G eorge  
Ainslie and Nick Haslam, 1992) implies that 
A is a hyperbolic function of r .13
For example, suppose future benefus are valued 
at ( l+ f t r ) -1 times their nominal value. Equating 
this lo expl -  f* + 7A(,\. y)dy 1 shows ihal A(j,.v + r) = 
a  / ( I  + ar ) .
In evolutionary equilibrium, the M R S in 
fitness must equal that in preferences. Com­
bining equations ( f )  and (14) gives
1 .,r + t
(15) 0 = 0( x, x +  t )  -= — 1 X(x,w)dw.  
r  Jx
The average value of A over any interval 
predicts 6, the M R T P  over that interval. 
Note however, that this rate refers to effects 
on survival rather than on consumption. 
Consequently, A is more closely related to 
the marginal rate of utility discount [ rj in 
equation (2)] than to the M R T P  for con­
sumption.
To define A, note that liquations ( 13) and 
(14) imply that
(16) E ( Z ( jc, j£ + t ) }
; exp| -  j  A( x , w ) dw
where Z ( x ,  x +  t )  =  e~' ,rn : R( x 2)/ u D(x  
Z  measures the beneficial effect of a unit 
increase in the recipient's survival relative 
to a unit increase in the donor’s. To calcu­
late E’(Z },  one must make some assumption 
about the process by which the recipient is 
selected. There are several possibilities 
worth investigating, but I will consider only 
one: I assume that the benefit is awarded to 
the singie individual whose value of Z  is 
largest. The problem thus is to take the 
expectation of Z  under this assumption.
This expectation depends on the joint dis­
tribution of the numbers of relatives of each 
age and degree of relatedness who are alive 
at particular times. 1 assume that the num­
ber of same-sexed offspring produced at age 
x by a parent of sex g is a Poisson random 
variable with mean / «„ (* ), and that off-a
spring of sex g survive independently to age 
a with probability l/.a). The Appendix de­
scribes an algorithm for calculating E{Z}  
and A(a_, y ) under these assumptions.
When costs and benefits affect consump­
tion, Z  is replaced by
V  =
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Age
F i g u r f  3. A( ' - S p e c i f i c  F k r t i i . i t v  ( F f m a l e s )
Notes: These schedules are normalized so lhal all have ihe same maximum value. 
Sources: 1906, Taiwan (Hamilton, 196(1)'. standard natural fertility (Coale anil T. .1. 
Trussell. 1474); 1973 Libya and 19th-ceruury Utah (Mahjoub A. El-Faedy and Lee L. 
Bean. I9N7).
The rest of the analysis proceeds as before, 
except that it is necessary to know the form 
of the function Pk[.* ,k ] and to take the 
expectation with respect to the joint distri­
bution of wealth, age, and relatedness 
among potential recipients. This task is not 
attempted here.
B. Methods fo r  Estimating the
Evolutionary Discount Function
The evolutionary discount function de­
pends on the population’s growth rate p,  on 
male and female fertility schedules [m m(.v) 
and m f(A-)] and survivorship functions [/m(,v) 
and /r(;r)]. The relevant values of these 
parameters are not those of contemporary 
populations, but those which prevailed dur­
ing recent evolutionary history. These past 
values are, of course, unknown. Fortunately, 
age-specific rates of human birth and death 
obey certain regularities that allow strong 
inferences about A.
The first of these regularities concerns 
the shape of the age-specific (female) fertil­
ity schedule in so-called “ natural-fertility 
populations.'’14 Although such populations
A natural-fertility population is one iri which birlh 
conlrol is either absent or else is applied independently
vary greatly in overall rates of fertility, there 
is little variation in the shape of the fertility 
schedule: the ratio of fertilities at any two 
ages is relatively constant from population 
to population, as is illustrated by Figure 3. 
Thus, one can be fairly confident that age- 
specific fertilities in ancient human popula­
tions were roughly proportional to those in 
contemporary natural-fertility populations.
Less is known about male paternity 
schedules. 1 have found appropriate data 
for only three natural-fertility populations: 
those shown in Figure 4. The paternity 
schedules illustrated there are broadly simi­
lar, but they vary more than do fertility 
schedules of females. Among 19th-century 
Mormons, paternity peaked when men were 
in their mid-twenties. In contrast, the peak 
comes at least a decade later among Turk­
men and Libyans.
Human survival schedules are also broadly 
similar, notwithstanding the emphasis that 
is often placed on variation among them. 
Coale and Paul Demeny (1983) define four 
families of model life tables, of which the
of the number of a woman's existing children. In 
natural-ftrlility populations, women may use birlh con­
trol lo space hirihs, but they do not use it to achieve a 
largel family size (Elizabeth A. Cashdan, 19S5’).
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F igure 4, A ge-Specific Paternity  (M a i .es)
Notes: These schedules are normalized so lhal all have the same maximum value. 
Sources: Libya and frontier Utah (El-Faedv and Bean, 1987); Turkmen af Persia 
(William Irons, 1979).
“ West” family seems most reasonable as a 
model for prehistoric human mortality. 
Within this family, one can choose survivor­
ship schedules for a great variety of levels of 
overall mortality, as measured by e£, the 
expectation of' life at birth.
Finally, 1 must make an assumption about 
the rate p of population growth during pre­
history. Although the human population has 
been growing for several centuries, its rate 
of growth prior to this must on average have 
been very low (McEvedy and Jones, 1978). 
Thus, I assume that p =  0.15
C. Evidence on Discounting: Inference 
from  Natural-FerliUty Populations
Figure 5 presents the evolutionary dis­
count function implied by the fertility 
and paternity data of 19th-century Utah 
(El-Faedy and Bean, 1987) and the Model
'"This implies both that 1 = L^/m(jr)nim(jr) and that 
I - Er/f( j)m f(.v). To satisfy these requirements, fertil­
ity and paternity schedules are rescaled as follows. Let 
m*(x)  denote the schedule of female fertility as given 
by the data. Prior to entering this schedule into the 
analysis, I rcscalc it as tn(( x ) =
An analogous rescaling is used for male paternity 
schedules.
West life table with mortality level 12 (Coale 
and Demeny, 1983 p. 47). This mortality 
level implies that the expectation of life at 
birth, eJJ, is approximately 45 years. In the 
figure, “age at investment” refers to the age 
at which a decision is made between an 
immediate and a delayed benefit. Ages be­
yond the age at investment are “ future 
ages.” Thus, the line marked by open circles 
shows the discount function pertaining to 
some investment that might be undertaken 
by newborn infants,16 whereas the line 
marked by stars pertains to investments by 
young adults.
To understand what these curves mean, 
consider a hypothetical 20-year-old woman 
who has been offered some survival benefit 
that will not arrive until she is 40. Since she 
is female and is now age 20, the starred 
curve in the upper panel of Figure 5 ap­
plies. It indicates that the average discount
l6The notion of investment by newborns is not quite 
as preposterous as it sounds. An infant who demanded 
less of its parents, for example, by crying less or eating 
less, would allow resources to be diverted from itself to 
other siblings. To an evolutionist, this constitutes an 
investment in these siblings. Nonetheless, 1 do noi 
mean to argue that such investments are of any great 
importance.
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y, future age
Figure  5. Ev o lu tio nar y  D iscount Function
Notes: A(.v, y) is the average evolutionary discount rate wilbin a five-year age interval. 
"Age al investment." rv, refers to the age al which a decision is made between an 
immediate and n delayed benefit. "Future age," y, refers to ages beyond the age al 
investment. The dolled lines show the rate of interest predicted by equation (12). 
where the generation iime is 7} = 27.98 for females and T„, = .10.45 for males. The 
figure is based on male and female fertility of 19th-century Utah Mormons (El-Faedy 
and Bean 1987) and on the Model West life table (mortality level 12. f',',=-47.5 for 
females and 44.5 lor males) (Coale and Demeny, 1983 p. 47).
rates within the four five-year intervals 
spanning ages 20-40 are 0.059, 0.050, 0.012, 
and 0.007, respectively. The average of these 
is 0.032, and this implies that the future 
benefit should be discounted by a factor of 
e x p [ - 20x0.032] =  0.529.17 The 20-year-old, 
therefore, should value this delayed benefit 
at only about half of its nominal value. In 
genera!, one applies a M R TP that is an 
average of A over the relevant interval.
''Equation 05) says that this average is equal to 
8 = 0.032. and equation (1) implies that ihe future 
benefit is discounted by a factor of e~e’, where r = 20 
is the time delav.
This same female should discount a 
shorter delay at a higher rate. For example, 
she should discount a delay of five years at 
an average rate of 0.059, nearly twice the 
average rate required for a 20-year delay.
Figure 5 predicts strong age differences in 
the M R T P  applied to delays of 5-10 years. 
Such benefits should be discounted only 
slowly by preteen-age children, very rapidly 
by young adults, and at intermediate rates 
by older adults.
Figure 5 also suggests that individuals of 
all ages will apply roughly the same dis­
count rate (about 2 percent per year) to 
benefits that are delayed more than 50 years. 
This is consistent with equation (12) and
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Fn;i id 6. En i r o f  M oR T A n n 'Li vdi on 1 Ht Even l-n onary  DisrnuNT
Func i ion
Notes: Shown are evolutionary discount functions for females calculatcd using the 
19lh-eenturv Utah fertility and paternity schedules and Ihe Model West mortality 
schedule, with two extreme levels of mortality. The eurve indicated hy “ a" symbols 
has extremely high mortality: the expectation of life at birlh (rJI) is only 20 years for 
females and 18 for males. The curve indicated by " v  " symbols has exlreinely low 
moriality (cfj = 80 for females, 76.6 for males).
shows that the approximations underlying 
that equation introduce no serious error.
It is interesting that the curves for various 
ages of altruism lie very nearly atop one 
another, so that A(x, y ) =  A*( y). The pat­
tern of time preference predicted here is 
well approximated by a discount function 
that depends on a single argument. This has 
an important implication: it precludes re­
versals of preference. Reversals of prefer­
ence occur when an individual changes his 
mind about the relative value of two alter­
native rewards as the time of their arrival 
approaches. For example, 1 may plan on 
Monday to diet on Tuesday, but when Tues­
day arrives I may succumb instead to the 
temptation of a chocolate cake. Empirical 
work on this issue has relied on theoretical 
work showing that preference reversals must 
occur unless future benefits are discounted 
exponentially at a constant rate (Robert 
Strotz, 1956; Ainslie, 1975). However, an 
important limitation of this analysis seems to 
have gone unnoticed: it assumes that the 
discount function depends on delay, but not 
on age. The present model provides a 
counterexample to the conclusion of Strotz 
and of Ainslie. To see why, consider two 
benefits that will arrive at ages y and y +  r, 
respectively. At time x <  v the two bene­
fits will be discounted by factors of 
e xp[ -  //A*i z)dz] and exp[ -  // + 7 A*(z)dz], 
respectively. The ratio of these discount fac­
tors is always
exp r A * { z ) d z
regardless of the value of x. Thus, there can 
be no reversal of prefere nce even when A* 
is far from constant. This implies that evi­
dence for nonconstant rates of discount 
cannot by itself account for reversals of 
preference. To apply the Strotz-Ainslie 
analysis it is necessary also to show that the 
pattern of time preference is age-indepen­
dent.
The value of the results in Figure 5 de­
pends on their sensitivity to the underlying 
demographic parameters. If each set of de­
mographic data implies a markedly different 
evolutionary discount function, then the 
particular results shown in Figure 5 are of 
little interest. In Figure 5 the curves for 
different ages at investment are quite simi­
lar. Thus, it is probably sufficient to com­
pare populations using a single age at in­
vestment, say, 20. This is done in Figure 6, 
which uses the 19th-century Utah fertility
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Model Wcsl mortality schedule (level 12) and Ihe I Olh-cenlury Utah Mormon paler- 
nily schedule.
and paternity schedules together with two 
variants of the Mode] West mortality sched­
ule. One schedule assumes extremely high 
mortality (e'f, =  20 for females, 18 for males), 
while the other assumes extremely low mor­
tality (£•,” =  80 for females, 76.6 for males). 
As the figure shows, mortality has only a 
minor effect on the evolutionary discount 
function. The similarity of these curves is 
remarkable in view of the extremely differ­
ent conditions that they represent. The 
mortality experience of all real populations 
can be expected to fall within the extremes 
represented.
The small effect of differences in mortal­
ity rates is surprising. Intuitively, one might 
expect discounting to be rapid when mortal­
ity is high, since the chances of living to 
enjoy a delayed benefit arc then decreased. 
However, the assumption of zero popula­
tion grow'th implies that populations with 
high mortality must also have high fertility. 
This elevated fertility increases the delayed 
benefit’s effect on fitness. Apparently, these 
opposing effects balance almost exactly.
Figure 7 shows the effect of various fertil­
ity schedules on the female evolutionary 
discount function. The three curves there 
use identical schedules of survival and of 
paternity. All three are similar in implying a 
high M R T P  among young adults followed 
by damped oscillations that approach a 
long-term rate of about 2 percent. The main
differences are in the timing of the peak. 
The fertility data for Libya and Utah imply 
that discounting should peak in the late 
teens or early twenties, while the Taiwan 
and standard natural-fertility schedules gen­
erate a peak in the late twenties. These 
differences mirror those in the fertility 
schedules (Fig. 3).
Figure 8 shows the cffect of various pater­
nity schedules on the evolutionary discount 
functions of females and of males. All the 
curves employ identical schedules of sur­
vival and of female fertility. They show that, 
whereas the evolutionary discount functions 
of females arc insensitive to the paternity 
schedule, those of males are somewhat more 
sensitive. The Utah Mormon paternity 
schedule implies that discount rates should 
peak when males are in their twenties, while 
the other schedules imply a somewhat later 
peak. Without knowing more about the pa­
ternity schedules that characterized human 
evolutionary history, it is difficult to choose 
between these alternatives. In spite of their 
differences, the predicted male discount 
functions arc broadly similar. All imply high 
rales of time preference by young adults 
and lower rates among their elders. All con­
verge toward rates of roughly 2 percent in 
old age.
In each figure, rates oscillatc up and down 
with a period of roughly a generation. To 




F i g u r e  9. V aluf .s t o  E g o  o r  S ci. f a n d  o r  D e s c e n d a n t s
N o le i :  T h is  show s  th e  log o f  c o n t r ib u t io n s  to  E g o 's  r e p ro d u c t iv e  success  o f  h e rs i  lf, a 
ch ild , a g randch i ld ,  and  a g re a t -g ra n d c h i ld ,  assum ing  th a t  indiv idua ls  o f  e ach  g e n e r a ­
tion  a re  h o rn  25 y ears  a p a r t  (ca lcu la led  from d e m o g ra p h ic  d a t a  for T a iw a n ,  1906).
In the special case when the marginal effect 
of consumption on survival is the same for 
the donor and all potential recipients, this is 
equivalent to the MRS in fitness for con­
sumption. Equating the marginal rates of 
substitution in fitness and in exchange 
[equation (4)] shows that the real interest 
rate should be near 2 percent. As before, 
the result is in good agreement with reality.
IV, Discussion and Summary
This paper has explored the potential of a 
new method of economic analysis, that of 
setting the MRS in fitness equal to those in 
preferences and in exchange, as first sug­
gested by Hansson and Stuart (1990). This 
procedure is justified by the hypothesis that 
human preferences are at evolutionary equi­
librium: that no mutation changing prefer­
ences could be favored by natural selection.
The quantitative results derived from this 
hypothesis all depend on demographic pa­
rameters. The relevant parameter values are 
those which prevailed on average during 
humans' recent evolutionary history. Since 
these are unknown, I have instead relied on 
demographic statistics from modern natural- 
fertility populations, whose vital rates are 
thought to resemble those of preindus­
trial populations. It would be unwise, how­
ever, to take any single modern population 
as the examplar of our unknown ancestors. 
We do not know whether prehistoric human 
demography was more similar to that of 
19th-century Taiwan, or that of 19th-cen­
tury Utah, to name just two possibilities. 
Nonetheless, it seems likely that species- 
wide mean demographic parameters have 
for a very long time fallen within the range 
spanned by modern natural-fcrtility popula­
tions. And as I have shown, the results are 
hardly changed regardless o f  which 
natural-fertility population one examines. 
Thus, the results are probably not compro­
mised by ignorance about prehistoric de­
mography.
The results may be summarized as fol­
lows:
(i) The hypothesis of evolutionary equilib­
rium gives definite form to indifference 
curves that are arbitrary in the classical 
Fisherian analysis. In addition to the 
classical indifference diagram, which is 
drawn on consumption axes, I intro­
duce a complementary diagram (Fig. 2) 
that displays the same information on 
survival axes. A market line that is lin ­
ear on consumption axes becomes
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concave'on survival axes. In evolution­
ary equilibrium, indifference curves are 
more convex on consumption axes than 
on survival axes, but they are convex in 
either case.
(ii) Algebraic results arc obtained by 
equating two expressions for the MRS 
in preferences: one derived from the 
hypothesis of evolutionary equilibrium, 
and the other from a familiar additively 
separable intertemporal utility func­
tion. The result implies that the 
marginal utility of dated consumption 
depends on age as well as on level of 
consumption. I suggest a formulation in 
which the subjective rate 17 of utility 
discount is zero when an investment 
benefits the investor himself. In the 
general case, 17 ~ ( l n / - ) / T  where 7 is 
the delay between investment and re­
turn on investment and r is the coef­
ficient of relationship between the in­
" vestor and the recipient. Thus, for a
fked degree of relatedness r < 1 , the 
subjective rate of utility discount is in­
" versely proportional to 7 .
(iii) The analysis confirms some classical 
ideas about the causes of time prefer­
ence, but it also suggests revisions. It 
identifies three factors that lead hu­
mans to prefer immediate over delayed 
benefits: (a) an expectation of rising 
consumption, (b) declining reproduc­
tive value, and (c) the possibility that 
delayed benefits may accrue to children 
or other descendants rather than to the 
investor. Factor (a) is well known to 
economists (Fisher, 1930 pp. 73-75). 
Factor (h) combines a familiar and a 
novel effect. After reproductive matu­
rity, reproductive value declines both 
because of a steady decrease in the 
expectation of future life and because 
of a decline with age in fertility. The 
first of these effects is well known 
(Fisher, 1930 pp. 84-85), but the effect 
of declining fertility has apparently not 
been discussed. Its implications are im­
portant, however, for it underlies all of 
the age effects discussed below. Finally,
- factor (c) makes definite what bas 
heretofore been arbitrary; the strength
of the bequest motive. Survival benefits 
to descendants are discounted by a fac­
tor of 2~' \  where d  is 1 for offspring, 2 
for grandchildren, and so forth.
(iv) The hypothesis of evolutionary equilib­
rium implies that the marginal rate of 
time preference (MRTP) will vary both 
with age and with the length of delay. 
Young adults should discount at a 
higher rate than their elders, especially 
over short delays. The predicted age 
effect receives support from the com­
mon observation that young adults seem 
to live as if there were no tomorrow, 
and from the fact that crime rates are 
high among this age group18 (T. Hirschi 
and M. Gottfredson, 1983; Walter R. 
Gove, 1985; Martin Daly and Margo 
Wilson, 1990). It may also be relevant 
that empirical studies of college stu­
dents have concluded that humans dis­
count rapidly (Richard Thaler, 1981; 
John K. Horowitz, 1991; Gordon C. 
Winston and Richard G. Woodbury,
1991), while studies of individuals near­
ing retirement have reached the oppo­
site conclusion (L. J. Kotlikoff et al., 
1982; Alan Blinder et al., 1983).
(v) The predicted discount functions imply 
that young adults should discount 
longer delays at progressively lower 
rates. This pattern is often reported in 
empirical studies (Thaler, 1981; Win­
ston and Woodbury, 1991) and has been 
used to explain the phenomenon of 
preference reversal. Yet no reversals of 
preference are implied under the pre­
sent model. As shown above, noncon­
stant discount rates need not imply 
preference reversals unless the pattern 
of time preference is age-independent.
(vi) The hypothesis of evolutionary equilib­
rium implies that the interest rate
i s lt is p lausib le  lo s u p p o se  tha t  a high M R T P  does,  
in fact. e n c o u r a g e  c r im e :  Ihe  be nef i t s  o f  c r im e  are  
o f ten  im m e d ia te ,  and  its costs  a re  de layed .  Th is  poin t 
o f  view is o f ten  e x p re ssed  in th e  c r im ino log ica l  l i te ra ­
tu re  ( J a m e s  Q .  W ilson and  R ich a rd  J.  H e r rn s te in ,  1985 
p. 205), and  is s u p p o r t e d  by at least  o n e  em pir ica l  
s tudy (F. Buss,  1964).
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should be close to
(17) : = (In 2 ) /  T  + p
where T  is the generation time and p 
is the rate of population growth [see 
equation (12)]. The idea that the real 
interest rate should depend on the rate 
of population growth goes back at least 
to Paul Samuelson (1958), who found 
an equilibrium at i =  p.  However, this 
equilibrium is dynamically unstable in 
Samuelson’s model until money is in­
troduced. Hansson and Stuart (1990) 
find that this equilibrium is stable after 
all, when preferences evolve by natural 
selection. Their result differs from 
equation (17) because they assume (un- 
realistically) that parents and offspring 
are genetically identical. The ln(2) in 
my result is really — In r, where r =  \  is 
the genetic correlation between parent 
and offspring. When offspring are ge­
netically identical to parents, r =  1 and 
the first term in (17) disappears. This 
term measures the discounting that oc­
curs because human offspring are not 
genetic replicas of their parents.
The two terms on the right side of (17) 
change on vastly different time scales. The 
correlation between parents and offspring 
does not change at all, and large changes in 
p produce only modest changes in T . 19 A 
large change in T  would require evolution­
ary change in some parameter such as age 
at maturity or the rate of reproductive 
senescence. Thus, important changes in T  
happen only on an evolutionary time scale. 
On the other hand, p can change dramati­
cally from one decade to the next. Thus, 
one might expect the interest rate to track 
the rate of population growth over short 
time scales.
However, I would argue otherwise. Popu­
lation growth enters into the present analy­
sis onlv via its effect on the evolution of
preferences. If preferences respond via ge­
netic evolution, then this response will also 
be slow. This led me to argue above that'the 
relevant value of p is a long-term average, 
which will be near zero if human popula­
tions grew only slowly prior to the last cou­
ple of centuries. The real interest rate 
should therefore remain relatively constant, 
near ln(2 ) per generation or roughly 2 per­
cent per year, regardless of the current rate 
of population growth. If this view is correct, 
then models relating the interest rate to 
population growth will not be very helpful. 
The more important effect is that arising 
from the fact that offspring are imperfect 
genetic replicas of their parents.
Appendix: A n Algorithm for 
Calculating A(jc,y)
I assume that the distribution of the num­
ber of offspring of sex g born to an individ­
ual of sex £ at age .t (given survival to that 
age) is Poisson, with mean m s{x) ,  and that 
each offspring of sex g survives to age a 
independently with probability lg{a).  I also 
assume a sex ratio o f unity, which implies 
that m ( (.t) is also the expected number of 
opposite-sex births. These assumptions im­
ply that the numbers of descendants of each 
later generation born when the ancestor’s 
age is y are also Poisson random variables. 
Let hj (y  \ x )  denote the expected number of 
female descendants of generation i born 
when the ancestor’s age is >\ given that the 
ancestor lives at least to age x.  Since the sex 
ratio is unity, /! ,(y |.t)  is also the condition­
ally expected number of male descendants 
of generation i born at this time. Here, 
children are in generation 1 , grandchildren 
in generation 2 , and so forth.
Let D  denote the sex of the donor, where 
D e (m ,f ) ,  The conditionally expected num­
ber of daughters born when the donor is of 
age y is
™d(>')
^d( y) / i  d( x)
if y < x 
if y >  x
igSee, for example, Nathan Keyfitz’s (1968 table 7.4) where k D( x )  l l-1{ x ) m ^ ( x ) .  An equal num- 
tabuiation of the mean ;ige of childbearing. ber of sons is also expected at age y.
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Genbrations 2 ,3 ,. . .  refer to grandchil­
dren, great-grandchildren, and so forth. F e­
male descendants of generation i +  1 are 
produced by both males and females of 
generation /. Thus,
-/M zU X U .v z)+ k f ( y -  z)]dz
Consider first the expected numbers of 
descendants of generations 1 , 2 , . . .  (i.e., of 
genuine descendants excluding the ancestor 
herself). The number of descendants of sex 
g,  age z, and generation i who are alive 
when the ancestor’s age is y  is also Poisson 
with mean
uj  = h ;{ y -  z U y s O )  ' > 0
where the subscript /  indexes the various 
feasible values of g , i, and z, given and 
y.  There are only two feasible values of g: 
m for male descendants and f for females. 
Since descendants cannot be older than their 
ancestor, 0 < z < y. I consider only genera­
tions ; = 1 ,2 .......5 since I am calculating the
discount function only up to an ancestral 
age of about 100. This is sufficient since 
children begin to appear only when the an­
cestor is about 2 0 , grandchildren when she 
is about 40, and so forth.
None of this applies to the donor herself. 
The probability that she will be alive to 
receive the benefit at age y  is not Poisson, 
but Bernoulli, with mean l u( , y ) / i u( x ).
The coefficient of relationship between 
an ancestor and a descendant in generation 
i is 2 “'. Thus, equation (16) implies that a 
benefit accruing to a descendant of sex g,  
generation /, and age z when the donor is 
of age y would be discounted by a factor of
2; =
•'V U)
y. Let Z denote the vector whose /th  entry 
is Zj, and u the vector whose /th  entry is u,.
The expectation of is calculated by the 
following algorithm:
(i) Insert into Z the discount factor for the 
donor herself: v { y ) /  i:(x) ,  and insert a 
zero in the corresponding position of u.
(ii) Sort Z and u by order of decreasing 
values of Zy. Let j*  represent the posi­
tion of the donor in the sorted vectors.








- i = I
r ) i
exp - 52
( I — e "‘ ) 
H : ) /H  x)
if j  <  j *  




where /, as above, indexes all the feasible 
values of i and 2 , for given values of x and
The expression for the case where /  < j* 
follows because the distribution of the num­
ber of individuals of type / (where / < /* )  is 
Poisson with mean u,. Consequently, the 
probability of zero individuals of type i is 
the probability of zero individuals of 
types 1 , 2 , . . . , /  — 1 is exp[ - 22/ and the 
probability that at least one individual of 
type /  is present is 1 — e ~ u\  The other cases 
follow from analogous arguments. Taking 
the expectation over this distribution gives 
the discount function,
E { Z { x t y ) )  =  Z P iZr
This completes the algorithm.
This algorithm calculates the discount 
function favored hy natural selection, as­
suming that deaths and births are the only 
factors influencing discounting. Once this 
discount function has been calculated, it 
remains to calculate the discount-rate func­
tion, A. Typically, demographic data are 
grouped in five-year age classcs, and it is 
only possible to calculate the mean value of 
A within these intervals. The mean discount
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rate within a five-year age class is 
(A l)  A( x , y )  =  -  j *  +5A (r ,w ) dw
y
=  -  ln{ £ { Z (  j ,  y + 5 ) } /£ { Z ( .r , .v ) } ] /5 .
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